University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

2-15-2013

Is Ecuador's Social Participation an Illusion?
Luis Ãngel Saavedra

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Ãngel Saavedra, Luis. "Is Ecuador's Social Participation an Illusion?." (2013). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/14123

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 78897
ISSN: 1060-4189

Is Ecuador's Social Participation an Illusion?
by Luis Ángel Saavedra
Category/Department: Ecuador
Published: 2013-02-15
The Ecuadoran Constitution approved in 2008 is described as a guarantor or protective constitution
because it incorporates various legal innovations to protect rights and social participation in political
debate and public administration (NotiSur, Oct. 10, 2008). Five years later, not all innovations seem
to have met the objectives for which they were created, such as the two branches of government
added to the traditional executive, legislative, and judicial branches that make up the general
structure of the state.
The 2008 Constitution incorporated a chapter related to the rights of nature, provoking an intense
debate on whether nature could have legal rights, and a chapter defining protection proceedings
(acción de protección) as the guarantee that protects all rights, including those of nature. The latter
has now been used to block the national government from implementing its extractive policies.
But the Constitution also changed the structure of the state, incorporating the two new branches:
the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) and the Council for Public
Participation and Social Control (Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social, CPCCS).
In the past, the unicameral Asamblea Nacional (AN), previously called the Congreso Nacional,
appointed the principal control authorities, such as the attorney general (Fiscal General del Estado)
and magistrates of the Corte Nacional de Justicia (CNJ) and Tribunal Constitucional (TC). Similarly,
Congress also appointed members of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE). This way of appointing
the principal control authorities allowed the major political parties to appoint members to these
positions and thereby control state institutions, especially the judiciary.
Parties such as the rightist Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), which today has very little power,
controlled the judicial system for more than 20 years, giving it impunity not only for human rights
violations but also for graft and crimes involving financial administration and for allowing the
existence of shell companies, which finally led to the financial collapse of 1999.
In much the same way, control of the electoral system allowed the major parties to monopolize
assignments of elected authorities, such as members of Congress, through the systems for allocating
seats, which precluded the participation of minority groups, such as leftist parties or the indigenous
movement.

Role of Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social questioned
Intense debates in the Asamblea Constituyente of 2007-2008 addressed this problem and considered
the need to ensure the independence of the process for designating control authorities and those
who would make up the electoral system. To that end, it created the Consejo de Participación
Ciudadana y Control Social (NotiSur, Feb. 4, 2011).
Article 207 of the Constitution establishes the functions of the CPCCS by affirming that it "shall
promote and encourage the exercise of the rights involving public participation, shall promote and
set up social control mechanisms in matters of general welfare, and shall designate the authorities
that pertain to it in accordance with the Constitution and the law."
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The "Constitution and the law" now give one agency the power to name all control authorities,
including members of the CNE and the Corte Constitucional (CC), the Defensor del Pueblo, the
Fiscal General del Estado, superintendents of companies, banks, telecommunications companies,
etc. One seven-person body was created with the power to shape all state control entities.
The Constitution also stipulated the structure of the CPCCS and the background of its members:
"The selection of council persons shall be done from among candidates proposed by social
organizations and the citizenry. The selection process shall be organized by the Consejo Nacional
Electoral, which will conduct the competitive and merit-based public examination process, with
submittal of candidacies, subject to citizen oversight and challenge in accordance with the law," says
Article 207.
It is ironic that the CNE has the power to name the persons who will later appoint members to the
same CNE. In addition, grassroots social organizations, the indigenous movement, leftist political
parties, and all sectors that believe in social participation were naïve to assume that creating the
CPCCS would complete the task of democratizing the designation of control authorities and that
citizen nomination would take care of the rest. They assumed that the best professionals would be
named as CPCCS councilors and that their independence would be guaranteed. They also believed
that the governing party, one of the principal agents in creating the CPCCS, would not try to control
it.
The reality has been something else; the government nominated its own candidates from diverse
social spheres and even encouraged the creation of new social organizations to nominate candidates
for the CPCCS. The result of this process is the existence of a new agency, with basically total power
to nominate authorities, in the hands of the government or one party.

Cure turns out worse than illness
Various social and political sectors have challenged the appointment of the control authorities, since
all the designations have favored members of the governing party or personal friends of President
Rafael Correa.
The appointment system, according to the Constitution, should take place through a "competitive
and merit-based public examination process." However, a large number of the authorities chosen
who are close to the government did not obtain the highest scores, such as the Fiscal General del
Estado and some members of the CNJ and CNE, who had to resort to being retested. After retesting,
their scores inexplicably increased, and they ended up in first place, or their scores rose after an
interview, which was also more heavily weighted than the score based on the candidate's merits.
If in the past, the strongest parties jockeyed among themselves to control the state institutions;
today one agency makes such political confrontation unnecessary and appoints, under government
supervision, all control authorities, making it possible for the executive to influence and control the
other branches of government. It does not even need to negotiate politically with members of the
AN but only needs to be concerned with nominating candidates from among its political cadres on
behalf of citizen organizations created for that purpose.
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